Tuesday, December 31, 2019

Canada - Snow Mission




Source:    Matsimus

Every year since 1961, Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) gunners from all over Canada come together during Operation PALACI in Rogers Pass, British Columbia. Their job is to trigger avalanches using C3 105mm Howitzers in this vital choke-point in Canada’s transportation corridor.

These carefully planned artillery strikes are conducted to support the Parks Canada’s avalanche control program, which keeps the Trans-Canada Highway and the Canadian Pacific Railway safe from large, natural avalanches.

The C3 Howitzers have been modified and are positioned on one of the 16 specialized rings that line the narrow highway. Space is at a premium, with gun positions just large enough for the howitzers and their transport, surrounded by deep ravines and tall cedar and hemlock trees.



The tight space is why the C3 Howitzer is the weapon of choice in Rogers Pass. With two highly mobile detachments, the guns can be deployed at a moment’s notice, traffic halted, the guns put in place, rounds fired at any of the 300 predetermined avalanche trigger points, the roads cleared of snow and the pass re-opened in mere hours.


While safety is always paramount, speed and efficiency also rule this operation. With over 4,000 vehicles and up to 40 trains using Rogers Pass daily in the winter, traffic quickly builds up on either side of the pass in the designated holding areas that keep vehicles out of the 134 known slide areas.
Such a complex dance of vehicles, weapons, ammunition and military and civilian personnel would not be possible without great communication and coordination.

Monday, December 30, 2019

UK / France - Ex Gallic Marauder




Source: British Army



British and French airborne gunners have opened fire together, showing their readiness to deploy side-by-side on operations. Exercise Gallic Marauder saw 7th Parachute Regiment Royal Horse Artillery (7 Para RHA) and 35e RĂ©giment d'Artillerie Parachutiste (35e RAP) put through their paces at the Castlemartin ranges in Wales.

The training cemented links between 7 Para RHA and 35e RAP as part of the Airborne Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (A-CJEF), a partnership between 16 Air Assault Brigade and 11e Brigade

Why do artillery gunners become Deaf?


Saturday, December 28, 2019

Serbia - Sumadija MLRS




Sumadija is a Serbian multi launch rocket system mounted on an eight wheel drive truck which has two launch comigrations, Jerina 1 and Jerina 2

Source: Sumadija MLRS Multiple launch Rocket System

The Jerina 1 is guided ammunition using a inertial navigation system INS/GPS and a guidance system to control the fly of the missile. This missile can be fire from a range of 70 km to 285 km. The front of the missile is fitted with an HE fragmentation warhead which has a weight of 20 kg.

The Jerina 2 is unguided rocket with a caliber of 267mm and an HE/fragmentation warhead with a weight of 110 kg.

At the front of the vehicle, there is a crew cab and a cabin to operate the launcher station. The crew can and the cabin provides a protection against firing of small arms and shell splinters.

Turkey - Firepower




Source: Super technology Turkish Army

Turkish Army is the 2nd strongest Army in NATO after the US Army

Indigenous military project makes Turkish Army more advanced and superior to European Armies


Turkish Army has more Howitzers , MLRS , Tactical Ballistic Missiles , UCAVs than British+French+German+Italian Armies combined


MPT-76 Battle Rifle
OMTAS Anti Tank Missile
UKAP Unmanned armed ground Vehicle
ALTAY Tank
T-155 Howitzer
YAVUZ Truck mounted Howitzer
260 PARS and KAPLAN Anti Tank Vehicles
TRG-122 guided MLRS ... ( only TURKEY in NATO )
TRG-300 guided MLRS ...( only The US and Turkey in NATO )
J600T Tactical Ballistic Missile
ATACMS Tactical Ballistic Missile
KHAN Tactical Ballistic Missile .( only The US and Turkey in NATO )
KORAL Radar Electronic Warfare System ..( only The US and Turkey in NATO )

212 Sikorsky Blackhawk Helicopters
28 Eurocopter AS532 Cougar Helicopters
10 Boeing CH-47F Chinook Helicopters
-- TAI T-625 utility Helicopter
118 TAI T-129 Attack Helicopter 83+35 optional ...( The best fleet in Europe )
92 Bayraktar TB-2 Tactical UAV-UCAV ... ( The best fleet in Europe )
6 ANKA-S UCAVs ( General Command of Gendarmerie )



Russia - 2S38 Derivaciya

The 2S38 'Derivaciya'is a new Russian Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun (SPAAG). The cutting-edge artillery unit features a fully automated turret which is operated remotely by the machine’s three-man crew. While the 57mm gun is essentially an anti-aircraft piece, it’s also able to strike land targets with high precision.

 
 Mounted on the BMP-3 amphibious armored vehicle, the 2S38 is designed to shoot down UAVs, cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, tactical warplanes and air support helicopters.


2S38 Derivaciya
  





Sunday, December 1, 2019

UK - Maximising the UK’s Tactical and Operational Firepower

Royal United Services Institute
The Future of Fires: Maximising the UK’s Tactical and Operational Firepower
Jack Watling
Occasional Papers, 27 November 2019


https://www.forces.net/news/warning-british-forces-would-be-outgunned-against-russia




 Video Source: British Forces Broadcasting

The UK’S 2015 National Security Strategy made clear that there was a risk that Russia would undertake offensive operations against NATO, and that the UK should maintain a credible deterrence posture. The ground forces’ contribution to this posture was framed as a warfighting division. Critical to any divisional formation are its fires, which shape the battlespace, protect Allied forces by eliminating enemy guns, break up enemy force concentrations, and enable friendly ground manoeuvre by destroying adversary enablers and suppressing their manoeuvre elements. The UK currently possesses a critical shortage of artillery, and the army lacks the transportation capacity to deploy and sustain a credible divisional fires group. If conventional deterrence is to remain a key component of the UK’s National Security Strategy, then the modernisation of its fires capabilities should be a top priority.

Modernisation should not simply replicate existing platforms. There are four capability trends that are transforming the delivery of fires. The first is range, which may be expected to increase by 50% to 100% across most platforms by 2040. The second is the maturation of active seeker munitions able to autonomously course correct, which is simplifying kill chains, and improving the probability of kill (PK) of fires systems. The third is the ability to rapidly fuse sensor data to centrally coordinate large numbers of guns. Finally, there are an increasing array of effective defensive measures which, though small in number and with a limited range, can produce protected nodes on the battlefield.

These capabilities are reshaping the modern battlefield. The higher fidelity of sensors and PK of munitions are liable to reduce viable force densities, while the extended range of fires systems must hold combat service support (CSS) at risk over greater distances. This is likely to create a battlefield that is fragmented, with small, dispersed force elements entangled in a zone of contestation, rather than confronting one another across opposing front lines of control. The side likely to prevail will be the one best able to rapidly bring firepower to bear in frenetic engagements. Operationally, however, warfare is liable to return to positional fighting between CSS nodes protected by defensive systems.

Despite these technological advances, precision will remain expensive. The UK must either retain a sufficient stockpile of anti-armour area-effect munitions and enough mass to suppress infantry with high explosive, or must reconsider its commitments to the Oslo Treaty, and procure cluster munitions. It should be noted that the moral objections to the use of cluster munitions can be mitigated. It is possible to significantly reduce the dud-rate of munitions compared with those employed when the Oslo Treaty was signed. Furthermore the moral objections to their use become somewhat moot in a high intensity conflict in Eastern Europe, where Russian and US forces will employ cluster munitions liberally. Without appropriate munitions, British forces will simply be outranged, outgunned and thereby defeated in detail by Russian formations.

A further critical element of future capabilities must be deployability. It is not simply a question of having a credible artillery compliment on the Order of Battle. The force must have an executable plan for getting a sufficient number of platforms into theatre within an operationally relevant timeframe. Deployability must therefore be a critical criterion for all newly procured fires platforms.

The exact structure of a credible divisional fires group to support warfighting is dependent on a number of trade-offs. However, an indicative minimum set of capabilities would comprise:
  • A battery of anti-tank guided missiles per battlegroup.
  • A battery of self propelled 120-mm mortars per battlegroup.
  • 72 155-mm 52-calibre self-propelled howitzers with anti-armour area-effect munitions.
  • A regiment of multiple-launch rocket systems with a compliment of anti-armour area-effect munitions, and long-range precision fires (LRPF).
  • Support for these capabilities from a robust data-centric command and control system, and logistics.
It is important to note that these capabilities are not only relevant to warfighting. The ability to deploy a credible warfighting force increases the risk for adversaries escalating to direct armed conflict, and thereby allows the UK to maximise its efforts in the competitive space. Conversely, forces designed for competition, but unable to fight credibly, can be deterred by the threat of escalation.